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Cultures differ in many important ways, but one trait appears to be universally 
valued: prosociality. For oneÕs reputation, around the world, it pays to be nice to others. 
However, recent research with American participants finds that evaluations of prosocial 
actions are asymmetricÑrelatively selfish actions are evaluated according to the 
magnitude of selfishness but evaluations of relatively generous actions are less sensitive 
to magnitude. Extremely generous actions are judged roughly as positively as modestly 
generous actions, but extremely selfish actions are judged much more negatively than 
modestly selfish actions (Klein & Epley, 2014). Here we test whether this asymmetry in 
evaluations of prosociality is culture-specific. Across 7 countries, 1,240 participants 
evaluated actors giving various amounts of money to a stranger. Along with relatively 
minor cross-cultural differences in evaluations of generous actions, we find cross-cultural 
similarities in the asymmetry in evaluations of prosociality. We discuss implications for 















Societies reveal their values through the behaviors they praise and punish.  Although 
societies may vary markedly, most appear to highly value one fundamental trait in others: 
prosociality.  Selfless actions are publicly praised around the world, such as Warren 
BuffetÕs contractual commitment to donate 99 percent of his wealth to charity and by 
Mahatma Gandhi and Mother TeresaÕs lifetime of self-sacrifice for others. In 
Christianity, generosity is exalted as a spiritual virtue. In Buddhism, generosity is 
likewise considered one of the two characteristics necessary for enlightenment. Western 
and Eastern philosophies both consider generosity to be a virtue and a goal for oneÕs 
moral development, as the writings of both Aristotle and Confucius reveal. In literature, 
Charles DickensÕ A Christmas Carol (1843) is as popular in the Western hemisphere as 
the Chinese childrenÕs story Kong Rong Giving Up Pears (1778/2011)Ña story about a 
boy sharing his pears with his older siblingsÑis in the Eastern hemisphere.  And in one 
of the largest cross-cultural studies focusing on gender differences in mate preferences 
ever conducted (Buss, 1989), researchers nevertheless found a striking similarity: the 
prosocial trait of Òkind-understandingÓ was consistently among the most highly valued 
traits by both genders in all cultures.  For oneÕs reputation in the mind of others, around 
the world, it pays to be nice. 
Recent research, however, suggests that it may not pay markedly more for oneÕs 
reputation to be really nice.  That is, whereas increasingly selfish behavior is judged 
increasingly negatively by others, increasingly selfless behaviorÑactions that benefit 
others more than the selfÑis not judged markedly more positively by others.  Instead of a 
monotonic increase in evaluations across the entire spectrum of prosocial behaviors 
ranging from completely selfish to completely selfless, there appears to be an asymmetry 
in evaluations of relatively selfish versus selfless behavior.  In one experiment (Klein & 
Epley, 2014, Experiment 1a), concertgoers judged another person who donated less than 
the suggested donation amount for the concert to be less warm (e.g., less sincere, good-
natured, and caring) than someone who donated the suggested amount, but did not judge 
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a person who gave more than the suggested amount any more favorably than the person 
who gave only the suggested amount.  In another experiment (Klein & Epley, 2014, 
Experiment 4a), participants evaluated a person who kept money for himself from a bag 
found on the street increasingly more negatively as the person kept an increasingly larger 
share of the money before turning it into the police. Participants did not, however, judge a 
person who gave away award money to a charity increasingly more positively as the 
person gave away an increasingly larger share of the money.  Increasing selfishness led to 
an increasingly negative reputation, but increasing selflessness did not lead to an 
increasingly positive reputation. In another experiment (Gray, Ward, & Norton, 2014), 
people indirectly reciprocated either a selfish or equitable action from another person in 
kind, but did not reciprocate another personÕs generous action with an equivalent degree 
of generosity.  Instead, they reciprocated a generous action with a merely fair action.  
Selfishness was repaid in kind measure, but selflessness was not. Additional research 
similarly finds that actions that go beyond equitable distributions are often not evaluated 
any more positively than equitable actions (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; 
Vesleý, 2015) These results suggest an important asymmetry in the reputational value of 
prosocial behavior, such that increasing selfishness leads to an increasingly negative 
evaluations but increasing selflessness does not lead to an equivalent increase in positive 
evaluations.  It pays to be nice, but not really nice. 
These results reflect more than ceiling effects (whereby people want to evaluate 
selflessness more positively than fairness but are artificially limited by a bounded 
measurement scale) because similar results are obtained in unbounded measures, such as 
estimations of a personÕs annual charitable donations. Rather, these results reflect relative 
insensitivity to magnitude when evaluating generous actions but high sensitivity to 
magnitude when evaluating selfish actions.  When prosocial actions were judged in 
comparison to each other rather than in isolation, the asymmetry in evaluations 
disappeared and increasingly generous actors were evaluated increasingly favorably 
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(Klein & Epley, 2014, Experiments 4b and 5).  These results suggest that people can 
appreciate increasing generosity in others when different levels of generosity are 
explicitly compared against each other, but that judgments of prosocial actions in 
isolation do not elicit these spontaneous comparisons and therefore do not reflect this 
appreciation.  These results seem to reflect a basic pattern of human judgment in which 
evaluations are sensitive to magnitude, or scope, when they elicit comparisons to similar 
alternatives but are insensitive to scope when they do not (Hsee & Zhang, 2010).  A 
selfish action, according to evidence from Klein & Epley (2014), enables a person to 
think of more or less selfish counterfactuals and thereby keep a given selfish action in 
perspective.  A selfless action, in contrast, does not seem to elicit the same kind of 
comparative thinking, rendering evaluations of selfless actions less sensitive to the 
magnitude of selflessness. 
Here we do not investigate further the underlying mechanism guiding this asymmetry, 
but instead report experiments conducted in 7 countries that test the robustness of this 
asymmetric pattern of reputational inferences across varying economic and social 
conditions.  Understanding the cross-cultural robustness of this pattern matters because 
evaluations of prosociality may be critical for encouraging cooperation between unrelated 
individuals within societies.  A willingness to help others even without the possibility of 
direct reciprocity is critical for creating the levels of trust and cooperation necessary for 
sustaining complex modern societies and markets (Barclay, 2004; Bowles & Gintis, 
2003; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971). TodayÕs large and 
relatively impersonal societies make the close-knit bonds that draw together small 
communities difficult to form (e.g., Grossmann & Varnum, 2015; Henrich et al., 2010; 
Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008).  
In lieu of direct reciprocity, the reputational benefits that come from prosocial actions 
are thought to create a motivation to behave prosocially, because of a universal desire to 
gain social approval (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; DeWall & 
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Baumeister, 2006; Twenge et al., 2007; Willer et al., 2010; Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 
2000). However, the connection between prosocial behavior and reputational benefits is 
currently thought to be fairly straightforwardÑif a person helps others, then his or her 
reputation will benefit commensurably. In contrast, if people across cultures fail to 
differentiate between small and large prosocial actions, such a result would add important 
complexity to existing research.  
Understanding how social systems could motivate prosocial behavior requires 
comparing evaluations of prosociality across cultures. Existing findings on evaluations of 
prosocial actions were obtained from exclusively American samples, raising concerns 
that broad conclusions about human prosociality cannot be drawn due to the idiosyncratic 
nature of North American cultures (Heine, Henrich, & Norenzayan, 2010; Nisbett et al., 
2001). If prosocial actions are evaluated differently across cultures, then culture-specific 
mechanisms, such as values or norms, may underlie the reputational consequences of 
prosociality. If, however, prosocial actions are evaluated similarly across cultures, then 
relatively basic and universal mechanisms, such as relative scope insensitivity, would 
seem to be guiding reputational inferences.  
Existing research on prosociality across cultures does not offer a clear prediction 
about reputational inferences because it typically focuses on variance in prosocial 
behavior rather than in inferences from that behavior. For example, a recent study 
examined how people rewarded or punished othersÕ prosocial behavior in a repeated 
public goods game (Herrmann, Thni, & Gchter, 2008).  Whereas participants in all 
cultures paid a personal price to punish another personÕs selfishness, participants in some 
cultures also paid a personal price to punishÑinstead of rewardÑanother personÕs 
extremely generous behavior. This suggests that some cultures may not value or admire 
prosocial behavior, and may instead disdain generosity. This possibility implies cultural 
variability in reputational inferences from prosociality.  In some cultures it may actually 
hurt oneÕs reputation to be really nice. However, punishing extreme prosociality does not 
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necessarily indicate negative inferences about prosocial actors.  In Hermann et al. (2008), 
punishing another personÕs generosity could also reflect a strategic attempt to counter 
social pressure to contribute to the public pool.  More generally, prosocial behavior can 
stem from many different mechanisms, ranging from admiration of another person to 
strategic attempts to exploit or manipulate others in specific situations (Spence, 1973; 
Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997).  Understanding the reputational consequences of prosocial 
behavior requires measuring the reputational costs and benefits that emerge in 
evaluations of othersÕ prosocial behavior across the entire spectrum of outcomes, from 
completely selfish to completely selfless. 
 
Overview 
Previous research suggested an asymmetry in the peopleÕs evaluations of another 
personÕs prosocial behavior (Klein & Epley, 2014). In one experiment (Klein & Epley, 
2014, Exp. 3), participants evaluated a person who was given $6 in an experiment and 
was offered the opportunity to give some of it to another participant, with no possibility 
for reciprocity.  Here we use a similar procedure to test the robustness of this asymmetry 
in reputational inferences across 7 different countries that vary widely in economic and 
social variables, and that have also been studied in prior research on prosociality across 
cultures (Hermann et al., 2008). 
Although a personÕs reputation may vary along many different dimensions, existing 
research suggests that a personÕs reputation typically varies only along two fundamental 
dimensions: warmth and competence (Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Peeters, 1995; Willis 
& Todorov, 2006; Wojciszke & Abele, 2008). Warmth is related to other-oriented 
outcomes (e.g., friendliness, trustworthiness, morality), whereas competence is more 
closely related to self-oriented outcomes (e.g., intelligence, talent, skill). Because 
prosocial actions are more relevant to oneÕs treatment of others than for oneÕs 
competence, we predicted that warmth judgments are more likely to be affected by oneÕs 
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prosociality, consistent with previous research (Klein & Epley, 2014). Nevertheless, 
measuring perceived competence enabled us to test whether people view giving without 
the possibility of being paid back as a sign of incompetence. 
 
Method 
Participants. We sought to capture cross-cultural variability on several social and 
economic dimensions. Our selection of 7 countries captures variability in social capital, 
economic prosperity, democracy and laws, and cultural value dimensions (see Table 1). 
We also selected our cultures to capture variability in the tendency to reward or high 
degrees of prosociality as found in a previous study (Herrmann et al., 2008). 
Procedure. The experiments were conducted between May 2013 and September 
2014. All materials in non-English speaking countries were translated and back-translated 
to ensure semantic accuracy. Austrian participants were recruited through a student email 
list at the University of Salzburg. Chinese participants were recruited through the online 
panel company Sojump. Danish participants were recruited through a student email list at 
Aarhus University. Russian participants were recruited in a classroom at Novosibirsk 
State University (n = 73) and through a psychology studentsÕ email list (n = 122) at 
Novosibirsk State University and Novosibirsk State Technical University. Turkish 
participants were recruited in a law course at Dogus University. British participants were 
recruited through a departmental participant pool at the University of Kent. American 
participants were recruited via Amazon.comÕs M-Turk online panel. American and 
Chinese participants, as well as Russian participants recruited through the studentsÕ email 
list were paid nominal amounts. All other participants received course credit in exchange 
for participating. 
The procedure was identical across all of the experiments. Participants read about two 
men who came to a research institution to participate in a study in which one of them was 
given a small amount of money and decided how much of it to give to another man (as in 
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a Òdictator game,Ó following Experiment 3 by Klein & Epley, 2014). We used locally 
common names for the actor and referred to the receiver as Òthe other personÓ (see Table 
3 for procedural details). Participants read the two men had never met each other prior to 
the experiment. Participants then read that the giver was free to decide on any amount to 
give, from nothing to the entire endowment. The endowment itself was denominated in 
the local currency. To minimize confounds related to the available endowment, we 
equated its purchasing power across cultures to that of 6 American dollars. 
We manipulated the amount the giver decided to give to be either 0, 1/6 of the 
endowment, 2/6, 3/6, 4/6, 5/6, or the entire endowment. These manipulations were fully 
between-subjects. Behaving equitably by splitting the allocation benefits the self as much 
as it benefits the other.  Giving less than half benefits the self more than the other person, 
and so is by definition relatively selfish.  Giving more than half of a finite endowment 
benefits the other person more than the self, and so is by definition relatively selfless.  
Participants then evaluated the giver on traits related to warmth (sincere, warm, good-
natured, caring, tolerant) and competence (competent, confident, independent, intelligent, 
competitive; Fiske et al., 2002; Klein & Epley, 2014). All ratings were made on 7-point 
scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). 
Our sample sizes appear in Table 4, and are as follows: Austria, n = 214; China, n = 
215; Denmark, n = 181; Russia, n = 195; Turkey, n = 148; U.K., n = 123; U.S.A., n = 
164. Variation in sample sizes was due to the ease or difficulty with which samples could 
be collected in each country. Actual sample sizes were determined based on time and 
funding constraintsÑwe simply collected as many data points as possible under these 
constraints. 
Construct validity. To assess construct validity, we conducted principal components 
analyses on the 10 traits we measured in every culture, using Oblimin rotation (see Table 
2). In all cultures we created the warmth composite by averaging the 5 traditionally used 
traits (sincere, warm, good-natured, caring, tolerant) and the competence composite by 
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averaging the other 5 traits (competent, confident, independent, intelligent, competitive). 
As Table 2 shows, the warmth and competence composites generally produced high 
reliabilities, with one exception.1
                                                        
1 Because the trait ÔcompetitiveÕ loaded highly negatively onto the warmth dimension, we also 
conducted the same analyses shown in Tables 4 and 5 after reverse-scoring and incorporating 




Warmth Evaluations. We first tested whether prosociality affects reputations across 
the entire spectrum of possible actions. For each culture, we conducted two sets of linear 
regressionsÑone with the amounts of money given predicting warmth evaluations, and 
the other with the amount of money given predicting competence evaluations.   
As Table 4 indicates, across all cultures, giving more leads to a more favorable 
reputation of warmth. This result suggests that prosociality has consistent reputational 
benefits. However, these reputational benefits were largely asymmetric. We tested this 
asymmetry using three different analyses of our data, all of which yield similar 
conclusions.  
In the simplest test of this asymmetry in reputational inferences, we compared 
evaluations of giving half of the endowment (3/6) against the most selfish (0/6) and most 
selfless (6/6) actions (giving none versus giving all). As shown in Table 5, participants in 
all countries judged the most selfish person more negatively than the fair person; only in 
one of the countries (China) was the most selfless person judged more favorably than a 
merely equitable person. In 5 out of 7 countries, no statistically reliable differences 
emerged in evaluations of the fair person and the most selfless person, and in one 
(Turkey) giving the entire amount was judged more negatively than giving half.  We will 
return to the latter observation in the discussion. 
In another test of this asymmetry, we conducted 3 separate linear regressions for each 
culture: First, a regression with all giving amounts predicting warmth; second, a 
regression with only selfish actions (giving 3/6 to 2/6 to 1/6 to none of the endowment) 
predicting warmth; and third, a regression with only generous actions (giving 3/6 to 4/6 
to 5/6 to all of the endowment) predicting warmth. Table 4 presents the results. In all 7 
countries, increasingly more selfish actions led to significantly more negative warmth 
evaluations. In contrast, increasingly more selfless actions did not lead to significantly 
more positive evaluations of warmth in 5 of the 7 countries.  Even in the 2 out of 7 
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cultures in which increasing generosity led to significantly more positive evaluations, 
sensitivity to gradations in selfish actions was higher than sensitivity to gradations in 
generous actions. In the U.S., increasing generosity was evaluated more positively (β = 
.24, t = 2.33, p = .022), but still not as much as increasing selfishness was evaluated more 
negatively (β = -.71, t = 14.95, p < .0001), z = 4.33, p < .0001.  In China, the difference 
the sensitivity to increasingly generous actions was also almost significantly lower than 
the sensitivity increasingly selfish actions, z = 1.76, p = .078. 
A final set of analyses sought to better understand the role of culture in evaluations of 
prosociality. We therefore tested whether culture interacts with the magnitude of 
prosocial actions. An ANOVA of warmth evaluations on all amounts given and culture 
revealed a main effect for amount given, F(6, 1191) = 187.78, p < .0001, !!
!= .070, a 
main effect for culture, F(6, 1191) = 18.06, p < .0001, !!
!= .015, qualified by an 
interaction, F(36, 1191) = 3.41, p < .001, !!
!= .093.  
To further understand this interaction, we conducted analyses for selfish and generous 
actions separately. For generous actions (giving 3/6 Ð 6/6 of the endowment), an 
ANOVA of warmth evaluations revealed no main effect of amount given, F(3, 691) = 
.46, p = .71, a main effect of culture, F(6, 691) = 25.57, p < .001, !!
!= .090, and an 
interaction, F(18, 691) = 2.03, p = .007, !!
!= .050. These results indicate some cultural 
variation in evaluations of generous actions. As Table 4 shows, cultural variation in 
sensitivity to generous actions emerged from ambiguity about whether generosity 
increases or decreases warmth evaluations. Chinese and American participants, for 
example, were most likely to view greater generosity more favorably (regression βs = .36 
and .24, respectively), whereas Turkish participants viewed greater generosity more 
negatively (regression β = -.22). Participants in other cultures were not sensitive to 
magnitude in generous actions, as none of the other relevant regression βs were 
statistically significant.  
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For selfish actions (giving 0 Ð 3/6 of the endowment), an ANOVA of warmth 
evaluations revealed a main effect of amount given, F(3, 677) = 175.36, p < .0001, !!
!= 
.053 a main effect of culture, F(6, 677) = 6.06, p < .001, !!
!= .025, and an interaction, 
F(18, 677) = 2.35, p = .001,!!!
!= .059. These results indicate some cultural variation in 
evaluations of selfish actions. As Table 4 shows, in some cultures the sensitivity to 
gradations in selfish actions was higher than in others. American participants, for 
example, were the most sensitive to gradations in selfish actions (regression β = .71), 
whereas Austrian participants were least sensitive (regression β = .53). However, unlike 
generous actions whose impact on evaluations was ambiguous, participants in all cultures 
viewed lower giving in selfish actions more negatively. Overall, these results indicate that 
cultural differences were observed both in evaluations of selfish actions and generous 
actions, but the impact of these cultural differences on evaluations differed between 
selfish and generous actions. Whereas greater selfishness always reduced evaluations, 
greater generosity either increased, reduced, or did not affect evaluations. We return to 
this topic in the General Discussion. 
Overall, these results demonstrate a high degree of similarity in the asymmetry 
between relatively selfish and generous actions.  ParticipantsÕ evaluations of othersÕ 
prosocial actions were consistently more sensitive to gradations in selfish than in 
generous actions. These results hold across cultures that differ markedly on other 
dimensions between these seven countries.  People, among different cultures, are 
generally more sensitive to gradations of selfish behavior than to gradations of selfless 
behavior.   This consistent pattern was also moderated somewhat by differences across 
the cultures we studied. We speculate on the meaning of these differences amidst the 
broader similarity we observed in the General Discussion. 
Competence Evaluations. The reputational consequences of prosocial behavior were 
less clear-cut when examined in terms of competence evaluations (see Table 4). The 
composite measure of competence was consistently less reliable than the composite 
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measure of warmth across cultures, but we retain the composite because in most cultures 
scale reliabilities were acceptable (α > .70; see Table 2 for details) and to maintain 
continuity with both the existing empirical literature and across our samples.  
 In 5 cultures (Austria, Denmark, Russia, Turkey, U.K.), greater giving led to 
significantly lower evaluations of competence across the range of possible outcomes. 
This result may have occurred because in our experiments there was no possibility of 
reciprocity, which is one of the rationales for generous giving. Participants may therefore 
have perceived greater giving as nave, unwise, or that the person simply misunderstood 
the nature of the situation. In the U.S., greater giving had no statistically reliable 
relationship to evaluations of competence. Finally, in China greater giving led to more 
favorable competence evaluations. Examining selfish actions and generous actions 
separately eliminates most of the statistically reliable relationships between giving and 
competence (see Table 4). In particular, generous actions (giving more than half of the 
endowment) did not affect competence evaluations, suggesting that participants did not 
associate extreme generosity with incompetence.  
Overall, giving more does not appear to increase evaluations of competence.  If 
anything, it tends to decrease competence evaluations in this particular context.   
 
General discussion 
Successful societies require cooperation between unrelated individuals in order to 
function effectively.  Such prosocial behavior is encouraged, at least in part, by the 
reputational benefits an individual receives from being kind towards others and from the 
reputational costs one incurs when being unkind towards others.   Those who behave 
prosocially earn reputations that encourage future trust and cooperation from others.  
Those who behave antisocially earn reputations that create distrust and avoidance. While 
we cannot generalize our findings to cultures and subcultures not tested here, we provide 
evidence for an asymmetry in these reputational costs and benefits that emerges across 7 
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cultures. Whereas increasingly selfish actions were judged increasingly negatively in all 
cultures we surveyed, increasingly selfless actionsÑgiving progressively more to others 
than to the selfÑwere not judged increasingly positively.  In terms of oneÕs reputation, it 
pays to be nice, but pays no more to be really nice.  These findings, while not drawing 
conclusions about any specific culture, were nevertheless comparable across cultures that 
vary on a wide range of social and economic dimensions.  Moreover, prosocial actions 
also do not earn reputational benefits in terms of competence evaluationsÑin Russia, in 
fact, generosity led to decreased evaluations of competence.    
These results replicate and extend previous findings among American participants 
(Klein & Epley, 2014). This replication therefore addresses concerns about unjustifiably 
broad conclusions that could otherwise be drawn from experiments using samples from 
only a single culture (Henrich et al., 2010).  This replication also addresses recent 
concerns about the reproducibility of findings in psychological science (Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), offering 7 additional exact replications of previously 
published results.  
Despite overarching similarities across cultures in the asymmetry between 
evaluations of selfish and generous actions, potentially interesting differences did emerge 
in the role of culture in these results. Participants in some cultures were more sensitive to 
gradations of selfish and generous actions than in others. Understanding why this is the 
case and how cultural differences in evaluations are related to cultural differences in 
prosocial behavior (e.g., Henrich et al., 2010) is a productive avenue for future research. 
For now, we tentatively raise the possibility that evaluations of prosocial actions might be 
related to anti-social punishmentÑdecisions to punish extremely prosocial others 
(Herrmann et al., 2008). Figure 2 plots anti-social punishment as reported by Herrmann et 
al. (2008) along with our participantsÕ sensitivity to selfish and generous actions (taken 
from our Table 4). Across cultures, anti-social punishment correlates negativelyÑbut not 
significantlyÑwith sensitivity to gradations in evaluations of selfish and generous 
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actions. This negative correlation could point to an interesting connection between 
judgment of othersÕ prosocial actions and behavior towards prosocial others. Our ability 
to test this possibility is limited because our data contain only 7 cultures, too small a 
number to establish meaningful conclusions. Future research can measure both 
evaluations and punishment decisions to definitively test whether the two are causally 
related. 
Notwithstanding these relatively small cultural differences, the overarching cross-
cultural similarities may imply that the psychological mechanisms underlying 
asymmetric evaluations of prosocial actions may also be relatively similar across 
cultures. These mechanisms may therefore be basic cognitive or affective processes that 
are relatively independent of culturally conditioned input. Two potential mechanisms 
have been documented in American samples and are potential candidates for future 
investigation. The first is that people are insensitive to magnitude when evaluating 
generous actions because selfish actions are more common and therefore can be more 
easily evaluated than generous actions (Klein & Epley, 2014).  Existing research finds 
that familiarity with a stimulus enables people to notice finer gradations of this stimulus 
(Hsee & Zhang, 2010; Moredwedge et al., 2009). The same psychological process can 
apply in evaluations of prosocial actions. The second potential mechanism is the 
asymmetric affective consequences of prosocial and selfish actionsÑgenerous actions 
may not increase positive affect as much as selfish actions of the same magnitude 
increase negative affect (Gray, Ward, & Norton, 2014).2 Future research is needed to test 
whether these mechanisms explain the asymmetric pattern of evaluations of prosocial 
actions across cultures.  
                                                        
2 Another possibility is that people may believe that the motivation of generous actors are more 
ambiguous than those of selfish actors, perhaps because generous actions are seen a non-
normative (Miller, 1999). To our knowledge, no direct evidence for this mechanism currently 
exists, but it remains a theoretical possibility. 
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More broadly, the nature of the reputational inferences we uncover can have 
important implications for understanding how reputational inferences may motivate 
prosocial behavior. The reputational inferences we have documented suggest strong 
reputational incentives for modestly prosocial and cooperative behavior because such 
behavior provides the maximum reputational benefit to the actor without incurring the 
personal cost of an extremely selfless action.  Regardless of the precise psychological 
cause of an asymmetry in evaluations of prosociality, the functional outcome may be to 
create social incentives that promote cooperative behavior. Existing research emphasizes 
the punishment of non-cooperators as a necessary mechanism for cooperation (e.g. 
Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). However, the cooperative behavior 
necessary for sustaining complex modern societies may also result from the lack of 
incentives for very generous prosocial actions, which in turn incentivizes actors to engage 
in modestly nice actions. Reputational inferences could nudge societies composed of 
unrelated individuals into being modestly nice, enabling the cooperation necessary for 
successful societies, without having to overcome the challenge of motivating people to be 
really nice.  From an individualÕs perspective, behaving in modestly prosocial waysÑbut 
not necessarily extremely prosocial waysÑappears to be the most personally beneficial 
course of action.  It pays for oneÕs reputation to be nice, apparently around the globe, but 
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